I. Introduction
Good politicians are experts in the art of insulting. A decade ago, American politicians demonstrated their expertise by coining the term 'Fortress Europe' 1 . It took quite some time, and a good many concessions during the Uruguay Round negotiations over the WTO, before the pejorative label fell into oblivion. The bottom line of this paper is: perhaps too early. Communications is a global phenomenon these days, one should think. The conduits of communications, the telecommunications networks, are connected worldwide. Yet the pertinent legal rules of the European Community take surprisingly little notice of globalisation. They read as if telecommunications were an exercise in organising life within the fortress only, with just a few well-guarded drawbridges crossing the dangerous moats that surround it.
This paper is organised as follows: It starts by presenting the different meanings of the term globalisation (sec. II). For a theoretical foundation, it relies on work by political scientists on governance across multiple arenas. From this work the paper derives a series of hypotheses concerning how a European regulative policy, like telecommunications policy, might be expected to react to globalisation (sec. III). It contrasts these exiting theoretical hypotheses with the sobering reality of current European telecommunications legislation (sec. IV). The paper tries to explain this reality (sec. V). It concludes with a normative outlook (sec. VI).
A caveat is warranted here. Although this paper relies on work of political scientists, it is the work of a lawyer. This feature plays itself out in two respects. The evidence is strictly limited to the law in force, legislative drafts or policy documents officially introduced into the legislative process. More specifically, the paper exclusively uses the current revision of the telecommunications framework as evidence 2 . Political scientists would certainly double check this material with other empirical methods, and interviews with relevant actors in particular 3 . Since the evidence is restricted, the paper cannot make causal claims. It is confined to functionality: If A is the goal, then B helps further it. Or vice versa: If B is the action, the actual goal cannot be A. At one point in our argument, this limitation will become relevant. In legislative practice we will find a good number of actions that are functional for both globalisation and Europeanisation. Due to the methodological restriction, we will not be able to actually prove that they are indeed the result of the latter. We will only be able to demonstrate the (high) plausibility of this thesis.
1 See e.g. HUFBAUER und SCHMITZ in Oppermann und Molsberger 1991. 2 All documents are made available at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/index_en.htm (visited on August 21, 2001) . By now, the convenient separate web site for the telecommunications framework has disappeared. The documents can be accessed via http://europa.eu.int/pol/infso/index_en.htm ( visited on January 16, 2002). For details see below IV. 3
On their methodology see KING, KEOHANE und VERBA Designing social inquiry 1994.
II. Dimensions of Globalisation
There is much controversy about globalisation. Obviously there are those who think it is bad 4 , and others who think it is good 5 . But an equally lively controversy concerns the question about what globalisation actually means. It is partially also a controversy over the appropriate conceptual tools for understanding the phenomenon. A first distinction concerns the object of globalisation. In this context, the globalisation of markets is not itself of interest 6 . When applied to government, globalisation characterises a -partial or even total -loss of autonomy of the nationstate. Those who use the term in this way disagree, however, about the dimension of the loss.
The most basic dividing line is between rational choice and constructivist approaches 7 . The former look at individual actors maximising some utility, the latter at the social context in which individual action is embedded. Another way of putting the dividing line is that the former look at interests, the latter at ideas 8 .
On the interest side, those are most prominent who equate globalisation and regulatory competition 9 . In the terminology of economic competition theory, the nation-states no longer have a governance monopoly. They have shifted into a situation of monopolistic competition 10 . Other nation-states offer different bundles of public goods. Regulatees are able to move to these substitutes 11 . A related concept might be more appropriate for understanding the effect. It replaces the metaphor of competition on a market with the metaphor of members controlling the management of an organisation. There are two conceivable mechanisms for doing that: voice and exit 12 .
Within a traditional nation-state, regulatees can only make use of the former mechanism. Globalisation adds the second. Exit becomes so easy that it is turned into a practical option, at least for some actors. If an actor can credibly threaten government with exit, his voice also becomes much louder. Market entry by outside suppliers can be a functional equivalent to the exit of formerly captive regulatees. This is so if the new entrants into the national market can at least partly operate under the less stringent rules in force at their place of origin. Acountry importing foreign products may be able to impose its product regulations on them. But it will normally not have an opportunity to control production, organisation or funding. For an overview see ENGEL in Engel und Keller 2000a, 245-258. 18 See only HÉRITIER in Héritier 2001, 3-9. 19 More on this difference from ENGEL Völkerrecht als Tatbestandsmerkmal 1989, 258-328. 20 Comprehensive, though somewhat dated, TEGGE ITU 1994. 21 For 
III. Exiting Hypotheses: A System of Multilevel Governance In the Face of Globalisation
The European Union is a functioning system of multilevel governance. There is Europe, the Member States, in federal States like Germany also the members of this national federation, the municipalities, often also autonomous regional bodies. There are many functional governmental regulatory bodies at all these levels, like the independent Regulierungsbehörde Telekommunikation und Post. Finally, there are a multitude of private or hybrid regulatory institutions, like the European Telecommunications Standardisation Institute (ETSI). As shall be discussed below, globalisation potentially affects their policies (section 1), but it also affects the institutional framework for policy-making (section 2). In theory, the individual elements, and the system as a whole, have three options for reacting to the challenge: mitigation (section 3), adaptation (section 4) and preference change (section 5). Here the focus is on the options of European actors, exercising their powers for autonomous reaction.
Effects of Globalisation on Policies
The effect of globalisation on policies is obvious 33 . It directly follows from the definition of globalisation. We have defined globalisation as a (partial) loss of regulatory autonomy. In a rational choice perspective, European regulators must submit to competitive pressure from abroad, or to the regulatory activities of foreign regulatory bodies. 
Effects of Globalisation on Political Institutions
Less obvious, but no less important, are the potential impacts of globalisation on formal and informal political institutions 40 . Again, a rational choice perspective and a constructivist perspective can be distinguished.
In a rational choice view, changes in the political opportunity structure are decisive. 
Mitigation
Theoretically, the European political system, or any of its components, can parry the challenge of globalisation in three distinct ways: by mitigation, adaptation, or preference change 54 . Mitigation is a defence strategy. Feasible defences mirror the reasons for globalisation.
If globalisation comes in the form of regulatory competition, the previously autonomous regulatory body must strive to make exit more difficult 55 . There are many ways of doing this. An outright prohibition is only the most obvious approach. But throughout history many states have made emigration impossible or at least dependent on an explicit permission 56 . The most popular strategy is making exit more costly. This can be done via asymmetric taxation. This is what the famous conflict over removing headquarters from one Member State of the EC to another is about. After Centros, going abroad became much more of a practical option than before 57 . When we characterised regulatory competition as an instance of monopolistic competition we also implicitly expressed the idea that there are considerable exit costs. Normally, firms do not have the option of customized exit from those provisions of national law that they dislike. They have to swap whole regulatory packages, taking the British instead of the German package, for instance. There is a constructivist option, too. Nation-states, or the European Union, could try to discourage private actors from exit by shaming them if they go. The famous 'buy British' campaign is an instance. It shamed customers who bought foreign products, and thereby circumvented any national regulation not directly affecting product quality.
In principle, the same options also exist if a loss of regulatory autonomy originates in the globalisation of regulated markets. But they are more difficult to apply. For then it is not sufficient to specifically target those national actors who might be tempted to exit. Instead, the whole market must be (re-)nationalised. Legally, it is easy to prevent regulatory authority from being siphoned away by international regulators. Their jurisdiction depends on the ratification of a treaty by the national parliament. Yet politically, it is not always easy not to confer, or to pull back jurisdiction. Private regulatory bodies do not need an explicit transfer of authority from the national sovereigns at all. In principle, the nations, and Europe, might apply the same techniques of mitigation as they do in regulatory competition. They might, by autonomous rules, prohibit their subjects from applying these foreign rules; they might make this prohibitively costly; or they might shame those who rely on these foreign rules. But these individuals are themselves the addressees of these foreign rules. They will therefore object that, in contrast to the case of regulatory competition, the loss of national regulatory autonomy is not their fault. Maybe the foreign and the competing national rules are even contradictory. In that case, addressees would rightly ask to be protected from tragic choices. For all these reasons, the practical options will therefore usually boil down to an open political fight between the national regulator and its foreign adversary. If the foreign rules can only be implemented by the nation-state, another option is simply for the state not to implement them.
Remains perceived globalisation. If the national, or European, regulator itself does not think that autonomous action any longer makes sense, enlightenment by outside observers might help. If this regulator is itself the observer of prevailing social construction, strategic action is conceivable, but difficult to perform. The regulator would have to mould public perception differently. Or maybe it is enough to offer the public other salient issues. It then might be content to simply maintain the previous national regulation, once the globalisation issue is no longer centre stage.
Adaptation
The terms mitigation and adaptation are culled from the discussion of climate change 58 . Countries that did not want to take on rigorous mitigation obligations made a strategic move to introduce adaptation into this discussion. They objected that adapting to a different climate would be much cheaper for many regions of the world. Likewise, regulators exposed to globalisation are not faced with a choice between mitigation or withdrawal. Not so rarely, they can adapt to the changed environment. This can be (politically) cheaper, or even more effective.
If globalisation affects a particular policy, adaptation calls for altering this policy so that globalisation no longer affects, or damages, it. For this to be an instance of adaptation, the underlying policy preferences should not change. But regulators might find less vulnerable ways of reaching their constant goals. A very popular reaction is to shift from pure public to hybrid regulation. This is characteristic of many Internet related issues, like data protection, consumer protection or speech control 59 . There is a less benevolent view of adaptation, however. It inevitably opens up internal political debate anew. Previous compromises can crack. Interested actors can seize the opportunity to gain on other grounds. The general insight into regulative policy holds: there is almost always more than one option for addressing a true social problem. And these solutions almost always differ on distributional grounds. Effectively imposing one solution, and not any other, is therefore the safest way of securing distributional gains. For after the fact, all actors would lose by abolishing that solution, even those who lose on the distribution side. In game-theoretic terms, the distributional gain is a Nash equilibrium 62 . One application of this general idea is particularly likely: the Commission of the EU could maintain that it is necessary to extend its powers in order to adapt to globalisation, and this would be to the detriment of Member States or other European political organs 63 .
Preference Change
If you can't beat them, join them. If globalisation affects specific policies, regulators have the same option 64 . They can make their cause what was originally only the political will of a foreign or superior regulator. They also can interpret regulatory competition as a healthy stimulus to internal betterment. For individuals, the parallel process is well studied by psychologists. A change of attitude is a mechanism to preserve self-esteem. mechanism here. It suffices to point to a change in political preferences as a third option for a previously autonomous regulatory body.
IV. Sobering Reality: European Telecommunications Law Has Hardly Been Affected by Globalisation
Against this rich theoretical backdrop, the reality of European Telecommunications Law that is being developed is quite sobering. European Telecommunications Law is currently undergoing a major overhaul, called the new telecommunications framework 69 . In what follows, these documents shall be used as (sole) evidence. There are, it is true, a number of explicit references to international issues to be found in these documents (section 1). But most of them read as if globalisation just did not take place. The small exceptions concern rather marginal issues. There is hardly a sign of mitigation (section 2). Adaptation is the only debatable issue (section 3). But it is at least highly plausible that the apparent signs of adaptation are mere instances of Europeanisation. Are we thus faced with a neglect of globalisation by the European Community, and by the Commission in particularsection 4.)?
Explicit References to International Issues
In all the many documents on the new regulatory framework for telecommunications, the term 'globalisation' is merely mentioned once, and in a totally marginal reference:
Numbering requirements in Europe, the need for the provision of pan-European and new services and the globalisation and synergy of the electronic communications market require the Community to harmonise national positions in accordance with the Treaty in international organisations and fora where numbering decisions are taken 70 .
Apart from that, there are a good number of references to the international dimension of telecommunications. But most of them concern issues that were no different ten years ago, when nobody spoke about globalisation 71 . These issues shall be discussed below. Respect is, of course, paid to the international legal obligations of the Community and its Member States (section a). The Community organs and the Member States must specify who speaks for them externally (section b). In antitrust law, markets sometimes must be defined in a way that transgresses 
b) External Relations
The many references to international issues in the Draft Radio Spectrum Directive boil down to a conflict between the EU and its Member States over external powers. Thus far the Community has not had much say about radio spectrum management 79 
d) Internet
The most outspoken acknowledgement of the global character of telecommunications is to be found in the Draft Data Protection Directive for Telecommunications Services. It reads:
The Internet is overturning traditional market structures by providing a common, global infrastructure for the delivery of a wide range of electronic communications services. But apart from that, the EU is still hesitant to develop its own Internet policy 96 .
Mitigation
If one looks at telecommunications legislation, European actors do not seem to be concerned by globalisation. There is hardly a trace of attempts to mitigate its impact. The only explicit reference to market access by foreign firms is to be found in the Draft Decision on the Radio Spectrum. The Commission considers the conclusion of international treaties on access with third countries on a reciprocal basis 97 .
There are considerable efforts to draw a strict line between telecommunications regulation and the regulation of communication contents 98 . Theoretically, one might interpret this as an attempt to fence off a protected core area from a set of rules that otherwise takes into account the global character of telecommunications 99 . But this is not a plausible interpretation. As we have seen, these texts hardly even show a sign of an awareness of globalisation. that the mentioned rules respond to Member States', and in particular French, concerns with a loss of cultural autonomy.
Adaptation
In the same vein, it is quite dubitable whether legislative measures can be interpreted as signs of adaptation to a globalised regulatory environment. There are two sets of rules that do indeed have an adaptation effect. But the regulatory context does not make it plausible that they are meant for that.
The first set of rules makes Europe stronger vis-à-vis the Member States. This could in principle be interpreted as an exercise in making Europe, as a whole, more robust to global challenges. To use the language of political scientists, these changes increase the reform capacity of Europe 100 .
But again, there is hardly a sign of legislative awareness of globalisation. It seems much more likely that these measures are just attempts of the Commission to push Europeanisation forward 101 .
Let us have a look at the details. According to the will of the Commission, in the future the regulatory authorities of Member States shall no longer be allowed to define relevant telecommunications service markets. Instead, they will have to rely on the Commission's authoritative definitions 102 , as laid down in its (draft) Guidelines 103 . If they think a case is exceptional, they are obliged to reach prior agreement with the Commission before defining a market differently 104 .
Under normal circumstances, Member States will only be allowed to define the geographically relevant market 105 .
A host of other substantive issues are also to be harmonised under the new regulatory package: authorisation, i.e. legal impediments to market access 106 ; access to, and interconnection with, the networks of other operators 107 120 Draft Framework Directive (supra note 51) Art 3, see also preamble (11). 121 See in particular ibid. Art. 3 II: "Member States shall guarantee the independence of national regulatory authorities by ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally independent of all organisations providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services. Member States that retain ownership or control of undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or services shall ensure full and effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or control. Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities are able to act freely, without further authorisation or control from any other agency or body, subject only to the provisions of Articles 4 and 6 of this directive." See also ibid. Explanatory Memorandum, at B 4: "The success of the new framework will depend on the provisions being implemented in a consistent manner by strong and independent NRAs". decisions; their measures only take effect if the Commission does not declare otherwise within a month 125 . Under the Draft Access Directive, National Regulatory Authorities must also notify the Commission both of the names of operators deemed to have significant market power, and of the obligations imposed on them 126 .
Finally, private actors are given the opportunity to by-pass national governments. They can bring claims to the Group of National Regulatory Authorities 127 . If National Regulatory Authorities fail to resolve a cross-border dispute between private actors, they can submit it to the Commission. "In so doing, the parties renounce any further action under national law" 128 .
Similar observations can be made with respect to a second set of rules that has an adaptation effect. In several instances, the new regulatory framework calls for hybrid forms of governance, combining public and private inputs 129 : in the areas of technical standardisation 130 , spectrum management 131 and data protection 132 . These frameworks could be a means of getting hold on governance activities that would otherwise, due to their global character, escape Community influence. In accord with a 'better less than nothing' attitude, Europe would be changing its own, internal governance structure. But the pertinent provisions speak the language of Europeanisation, not of globalisation. The Community can bring a halt to national standardisation activities by transferring the issue to a hybrid European body 133 . The Commission grudgingly accepts CEPT activities in the domain of spectrum management, although these activities escape its control. But if the Commission is not pleased with the outcomes, it can step in with autonomous regulatory activities 134 . This gives the Commission considerable power of threat for informal negotiations with CEPT.
Neglect
In the theoretical part of this paper, we have presented a third option. Regulators can react to globalisation by changing their own preferences. Since we find neither mitigation nor adaptation, this would thus be the theoretical prediction. But there is not the remotest sign of preference change in the documents of the new regulatory package. What one finds, however, is pervasive Eurocentricity. The new rules aim at the creation of a true internal market for telecommunications services 135 . 'Trans-national' markets are defined as markets that transgress Member States, 
V. Explanations
How come? There are two possible lines of explanation, which will be discussed below. Thus far, we have only presupposed, not actually shown, that telecommunications are affected by globalisation. Maybe regulatory practice knows better. Maybe at closer sight telecommunications will turn out to be one of the happy protected sectors of the economy 138 (section 1). If not, we are faced with an interpretative choice between involuntarily 'unperceived globalisation' and strategic neglect (section 2). Given the limited evidence on which this paper is based, we cannot fully decide. But it at least seems much more plausible that strategic neglect is behind the regulatory practice.
Telecommunications as a Protected Sector of the Economy?
We have offered four complementary definitions of globalisation. The first definition points to regulatory competition. Competitive pressure rests on credible threats of exit. At first sight, telecommunications operators do not seem to possess threat power; for telecommunications is in essence the transportation of signals. This makes it inexorably a local business. The local character is obvious for the physical grid dug into the national territory, or hanging on poles erected along national streets. It also holds for cellular communications. They presuppose a dense network of senders and receivers within the territory. These standards tend to be tuned to the network of the incumbents.
Newcomers will hardly ever be able to offer all these complementary components on their own. And if they cannot gain such access themselves, market access depends on contracting with the incumbent, either freely or through a forced contract, backed by the regulatory authority. In the former case, the incumbent can easily protect himself 144 . In the latter case, the regulatory authority can see to it that conditions for market entry are unattractive for foreign suppliers. If they want to build independent networks, newcomers must get rights of way. This also normally means that they need help from a regulatory authority 145 . They must also dispose of numbering resources, provided by a regulated numbering plan 146 . In other words, they are operating on a market organised by way of regulation 147 . Government can use its power of organisation to make market access for foreign providers cumbersome. Finally, as long as taking up business in the telecommunications industry presupposes public authorisation, government can use the authorisation procedure, and its terms and conditions, to make market access difficult 148 .
At closer sight, however, national telecommunications operators are much less dependent on their government. Technically, satellite communications provide a way out. If an economically important nation-state exercises pressure on national telecommunications companies, the general high speed of innovation in this field 149 is likely to generate further loopholes quickly. Pervasive convergence 150 would make it easy to shift traffic away to less controllable substitutes. The nation-states, and Europe for that matter, can, at most, credibly threaten the local loop. All other telecommunications services can fairly easily be substituted by less vulnerable alternatives. Practically the most important way of doing this is by packet switching, as is done on the Internet. Communication is portioned into small data packages, each finding its way through the world communications networks separately. Packet switching was originally invented to secure communication even in the event of nuclear war 151 . The Commission itself demonstrates by the large extent be separated from the remaining telecommunications services. Finally, and most importantly, for economic reasons, neither nation-states nor Europe are likely to take the owners of the local loop as hostages for their regulatory autonomy. The opportunity cost would be prohibitive: for state of the art, internationally connected communications networks are an infrastructure for almost any other business 153 . No industrially developed country would conceive of cutting itself off from these networks, or making them considerably less effective.
A second dimension of globalisation under discussion here relies on the market definition. In accord with this perspective, globalisation is characterised by a definition of the geographically relevant market that transcends territorial boundaries. In accord with this alternative, the relevant product market can have an international element implicit in its definition. Obviously, not all telecommunications markets are global in one of these senses. But if one takes complementarity into account, the picture changes. Most telephony customers will rarely make transatlantic calls. But they are not likely to make a contract with a telephone company that is not technically capable of providing for international calls, even if their services are cheaper. They accordingly attribute 'option value' to the possibility of making or receiving international calls. While these considerations may seem a little speculative for ordinary telephony, they are obvious for customers buying Internet access. They want worldwide access. Their Internet service provider can only guarantee this, if he has concluded transmission contracts with backbone providers. Otherwise, the routers will not allow this traffic to pass 154 . If nation-states do not want to put this complementarity at risk, they lose at least some of their regulatory authority over telecommunications.
A third dimension of globalisation originates in an independent, superior regulatory authority. This time, the relationship between appearances and underlying forces is just the opposite of the relationship just described. Appearances clearly point in the direction of globalisation. All Members States of the Community, and the Community itself, have made commitments under the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services. These commitments cover all segments of the telecommunications services sector 155 . The following quote from a report of the United States International Trade Commission highlights why this is an important factor of globalisation:
EU members were under no obligation to extend market access privileges to non-EU members, nor were they subject to any penalty should they treat non-EU carriers in a discriminatory manner. Through the 1997 WTO commitments, the EU made a binding commitment to extend its current internal level of market access to non-EU service providers 156 .
There is controversy, however, regarding how far the liberalising effect of these commitments actually reaches; for lifting legal barriers to entry is not enough in telecommunications markets. All the other barriers to entry listed above may still prevent foreign suppliers from entering European markets. The WTO has not been blind to this challenge. It has supplemented the Agreement with a 'Reference paper', addressing the anticompetitive behaviour of incumbents, interconnection, rules on universal service, licensing procedure and the obligation to set up an independent and impartial regulatory authority 157 . All EC Member States have signed the Reference Paper 158 . Observers are divided, however, over the efficacy of these rules 159 .
Unperceived Globalisation, or Strategic Neglect?
Remaining is the last dimension of globalisation under discussion here -i.e. the constructivist one. If there is such a thing as perceived globalisation, the opposite must also exist. The indicators of globalisation analysed with tools from rational choice theory could be masked in the collective perception. Globalisation could go 'unperceived'. Is this what explains the conspicuous lack of concern for globalisation in the documents of the new regulatory package?
There is one element in this package that might support the hypothesis. The Commission is strongly preoccupied with the transitional dimension of telecommunications policy. The Commission stresses the difficulties inherent in getting from national monopolies to true competition 160 . For the time being, it has opted for asymmetric regulation. Incumbents are forced to grant newcomers access to the local loop 161 and to other elements of their networks, if appropriate 162 .
Accounting separation and reporting obligations shall make it easier to supervise them 163 . In order not to implicitly discriminate against smaller newcomers, administrative charges may not be flat 164 . But asymmetric regulation is to be phased out once the newcomers are strong enough.
Should new bottlenecks become visible, however, ex ante rules must be put in place early enough 165 .
Has this concern with transition been so dominant that the Commission, and the other actors involved in the political process preceding the adoption of the regulatory package, have simply overlooked the challenge of globalisation? While this is possible, it is not likely. In other, related areas the Commission has been quite concerned with globalisation: electronic commerce 166 Europe is not the right arena for solving global problems, and consequently try to bring the issue into the arenas of the WTO, the OECD or other international bodies. Since none of these organisations can muster up the political power of the EU, they might hope to preserve their autonomy this way. They might have already won, once they succeed in seriously protracting negotiations over the regulatory package. The 'window of opportunity' for the Commission might be lost. As repeatedly stressed, our evidence is insufficient to actually prove this. But considering all we have, strategic neglect seems by far the most likely interpretation.
VI. Normative Outlook
These are interesting findings for a social scientist. But what is in it for a lawyer? Not much, to be honest. Had our theoretical hypotheses turned out true, a host of normative questions would have ensued: Is globalisation a justification for interferences with fundamental freedoms, or human rights? Does the European legislator, under fundamental freedoms or human rights, possess a larger margin of appreciation when he reacts to globalisation 171 ? Do the three options of mitigation, adaptation and preference change rank differently under these constitutional rules? How is the principle of subsidiarity affected by globalisation? Does the European Community gain more room for action vis-à-vis the Member States when it acts in a globalised environment?
But we have not found a proactive Community policy addressing globalisation. The Community organs might just have overlooked the globalisation of telecommunications. However, it is more likely that they are aware of globalisation, but deliberately ignore it. One might think that the just mentioned normative questions would simply be mirrored. logical tool would consist in a duty to protect. Constitutionalists have indeed ere long discussed whether government is constitutionally obliged to grant its nationals diplomatic protection. Public international law characterises the term 'diplomatic protection' as the intervention by one sovereign state in another on behalf of the nationals of the former state. But constitutionalists agree that there cannot be a strict obligation to grant diplomatic protection, given the imponderables of foreign policy. Government is only obliged to properly exercise its discretion 172 .
More importantly, our question is not identical to the one constitutionalists were concerned with. If our interpretation of the findings is correct, the Commission does not shy away from international conflict; it does not want to treat telecommunications as an issue of gloabalisation in its internal policy-making. The normative question is thus one political scientists would address in terms of policy cycle analysis. Roughly speaking, the policy cycle consists of the following elements: agenda setting, problem definition, policy formulation, implementation, assessing outcomes 173 . Our question is one of problem definition. Given the strong indications of globalisation, the Commission defines the problem of telecommunications policy inappropriately.
Proper problem definition is certainly a normative issue. But courts seem rightly reluctant to impose a more appropriate problem definition on political organs. The danger of a gouvernement des juges looms large 174 . This is so for two combined reasons. The first is conceptual, the second factual. Problem definition is a normative endeavour. To criticise one problem definition, one thus needs a normative starting point. Unfortunately, there is not just one such starting point; instead, there are a good number of competing ones, like efficiency, liberty, fairness, or equality. These starting points cannot be translated into one another. There is no single normative currency, so to speak. Decisions must be taken that cannot be fully justified. In a democracy, this is what Parliaments exist for 175 . The factual reason is uncertainty. The legislator hardly ever has all the facts one might theoretically wish to know before deciding. Again, decision is the only way out 176 .
The most one can envisage are thus procedural rules. But European Community law is advanced in this respect anyhow. Article 253 ECT obliges the Community to give reasons for its legislative acts. In practice, a long preamble precedes the operative part of regulations, directives and decisions. Actually, it is mostly due to these preambles that we have been able to trace the neglect of globalisation in the new regulatory package on telecommunications. This is what the law can do. It is up to the political actors involved in European legislation to prevent the Commission from strategically defining the policy problem inappropriately. Occasionally, science can help by pointing out such neglect to policy-makers. This is what this article has intended to do.
